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CARRIERS-EXEMPTION FROMi LIABILITY-VALUATION.-J. M. PACE MULE
CO. V. SEABOARD AIRLINE Co. 76 S. E. (N. C.), 513.-A firm shipped a car
load of mules under a bill of lading containing the following provision:
"Should damage occur for which the said carrier may be liable, the value
at the date and place of shipment shall govern the settlement in which
the amount claimed shall not exceed * * * for a horse or a mule $100 ** *
which amounts it is agreed are as much as such animals as are herein
agreed to be transported are worth." Held, that where loss occurred
through carrier's negligence, the shipper could recover the full value.
It is well settled that a carrier may by contract limit his liability, ex-
cept for injury resulting from negligence. Ormsby v. Union Pac. R. R.
Co., 4 Fed., 706. In New York, a line of cases out of harmony with the weight
of authority allows the carrier to exempt itself from losses due to negli-
gence of its servants, but contracts of this kind are very strictly construed.
Wilson v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 87 N. Y., 87; Magnin v. Dinsmore,
56 N. Y., 168. The rule in the Federal Courts is that where the value of
the goods has been agreed upon, no greater amount can be recovered
where loss is due to negligence. Hart v. R. R. Co., 112 U. S., 331. But
here such a clause must be for the purpose of fixing the value and not
primarily an attempt to limit the carrier's liability. Eels v. St. L. etc.,
R. R. Co., 52 Fed., 903. Where the contract is fairly entered into and a
valuation agreed upon, the agreed value is all that can be recovered even
though the loss is due to gross negligence. Donlon Bros. v. So. Pac. R. R.
Co., 151 Cal., 763. The doctrine of the Hart case, supra, was followed
in Minnesota. Alair v. No. Pac. R. R. Co., 53 Minn., 160. Such a clause
is valid where the loss results only from slight or ordinary negligence.
Pac. Ex. Co. v. Foley, 46 Kas., 457; Zouch v. Ches. & Ohio Ry. Co., 36
W. Va., 524. Where the value of the article is undisclosed, a clause in a
bill of lading stipulating the maximum for which the carrier will be liable,
if accepted by the shipper, is binding in case of loss due to negligence.
Ballon v. Earle, 17 R. I., 441; Graves v. Lake Shore, etc., Co., 137 Mass.,
33; MacFarlane v. Adams Ex. Co., 137 Fed., 982. In many American
jurisdictions a valuation clause. in a bill of lading is inoperative when re-
lied upon to exempt from negligence, or to diminish the recovery of dam-
ages caused by such negligence. Adams Ex. Co. v. Holmes, 9 At. (Pa.),
166; R. R. Co. v. Wynn, 88 Tenn., 320; Express Co. v. Backman, 28 Ohio
St., 144. In Kentucky, Iowa, Nebraska and Texas, the State Constitutions
forbid common carriers to limit or restrict their liability as it exists at
common law. The Hart case, supra, is frequently cited as authority for
the proposition that a carrier may limit its liability for negligence, but it is
inaccurate to so cite it. The pertinent provision in the bill of lading in that
case is apparently an attempt to limit liability but it is very evident that
the Court considers it an agreed valuation. For remarks so construing
the case, see Duntley v. B. & M. R. R. Co., 66 N. H., 283; Eels v. St. L.
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Ry. Co., 52 Fed., 904. Though the bill of lading in the principal case
purports to contain an agreed valuation, yet, if, as the Court construes it,
it is an attempt to limit liability, the case is correctly decided. When all
the circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract have been
fully shown, the question whether there was an agreed valuation or an
attempt to limit liability may properly and fairly be left to the jury.
DEDICATIN-PLATS-PARKS-SALES OF LOTs-REVOCATION.-TowN OF
VINTON V. LYONS ET AL., 60 So. (LA.), 54.-Held, that the recording of a
plat with a vacant block marked "park" and the sale of lots according to
the plat, is an irrevocable dedication of the park to public use.
The word "park" written on the recorded plat and lots being sold in
accordance with the plat constitutes dedication of such ground to park
purposes. Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Worley, 49 Fla., 297. Dedication
will be consummated when lots are sold at auction after the announcement
that a certain part will be set aside as a public park. Borough of Belwar
v. Barnett, 72 Atl. (N. J.), 77. The principle is that the grantor is
estopped to deny the existence of the easement. Clark v. Elizabeth, 40
N. J. L., 172: The title created in the municipality is that of an easement.
In a few cases where the municipality has not as yet been created it is
held that the title is that of a fee simple which is in abeyance during the
interim between the time of the sale of the lots and the creation of the
municipality. Stephenson v. Lewis, 244 Ill., 147. But no amount of laying
out and planning will effect a dedication unless lots are sold on the strength
of it. Kruger v. Constable, 116 Fed., 722. The decision in the title case
is entirely sound.
ELECTIONS-ELECTORAL RESIDENCE-RIGHT OF STUDENTS TO VOTE.-
HOLMES ET AL. V. PINO ET AL., WHITAKER ET AL. V. SAME, 60 So. (LA.), 78.
-Held, that the provision of Article 208 of the Constitution of 1898 that,
"for the purpose of voting, no person shall be deemed to have gained a
residence, by reason of his presence, or lost it by reason of his absence,
while a student 'at any institution of learning," does not disqualify a
student of full age from acquiring an electoral residence in the parish
where such an institution is located. Each case must be determined by
its own particular facts.
The weight of authority shows that there is no special rule for deter-
mining the residence of students for election purposes. The same rules
that determine the domicile of other persons apply to them. Wickham v.
Coyner, 30 Ohio Cir. Ct. R., 765. The right to vote is dependent upon an
actual and not an imaginary residence, and it is not a matter of choice.
People v. Ellenbogen, 114 N. Y. App., 182. The rule laid down in Welch
v. Shumway, 232 Ill., 54, that a student supporting himself entirely by his
own efforts, not subject to parental control, and who regards the place
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where the college is situated as his home, even though he may intend at
some future time to remove, is entitled to vote, is in accord with the
majority of the decisions, and with the principle stated above. A leading
New York case states that acquisition of a -residence in the district must
not only be intended, but accomplished wholly outside his student char-
acter. lit re Goodman, 146 N. Y., 284. This rule was carried to an un-
reasonable extreme when it was held that a student had not changed his
residence so as to acquire the right to vote, when he entered a seminary
for the purpose of becoming a priest, and a rule of the seminary was that
no person be allowed to enter as a student unless he renounce all other
residences or homes, and that on his admission to the priesthood he con-
tinue in the seminary unti! assigned elsewhere. In re Barry, 164 N. Y., 18.
On the other hand it has been held, going to the other extreme, that a
student may vote where his college is located though he went there only
for instruction.- The fact that he is supported by his parents and spends
his vacations with them, is strong, but not necessarily conclusive
evidence to prove that he has not changed his residence. Hall v.
Schoenecke, 128 Mo., 661. The presumption is that the student has not
the right to vote, and if he attempts to do so, the burden is on him to
prove his residence, Welch v. Shuinway, 232 Ill., 54, and there should be
other satisfactory evidence besides the student's own declaration. In re
Lower Oxford Elections, 11 Phila., 641.
ELECTRICITY-DEFECTIVE INSULATION-PROXI-MATE CAUSE.-TROUT ET
AL. V. PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC Co. 84 ATL. (PA.), 967.-Held, that where a
boy on the roof of a house threw a corncob tied to a string over a de-
fectively insulated wire and pulled it towards him to detach his kite, caught
on the wire, and touched the wire with one hand and was killed by the
shock, the boy's act, and not the defective insulation, was the proximate
cause of the injury.
Electricity being an exceedingly dangerous agency, those dealing with
it are held to a very high degree of care commensurate with the danger.
Harroun v. Brush Elec. Co., 42 N. Y. S.., 716; Gilbert v. Duluth Elec.
Co., 93 Minn., 99. It is the duty of the company to use the highest and
utmost care to safely insulate its wires at places where people are likely
to come into contact with it. McLaughlin v. Louisville Elec. Co., 100 Ky.,
173; Fitzgerald v. Elec. Co., 200 Pa. St., 540. This duty as to perfect
insulation does not extend to places where no one can reasonably be ex-
pected to go. Calumet Elec. Co. v. Grosse, 70 Ill. App., 381; Hector v.
Boston Elec. Co., 174 Mass., 212. Contributory negligence on the part of
a plaintiff in an action for injury done by electricity precludes recovery.
Cumb rland v. Lottig, 95 Md., 42; Danville St. Car Co. v. Watkins, 97 Va.,
713. As to the duty to guard against injury to children from electric
wires there is no general rule. Most Courts recognize a higher duty to
children than to other persons. Denver Elec. Co. v. Walter, 39 Colo., 301;
Nelson v. Branford Lighting Co., 75 Conn., 548. Where a boy climbing
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over a railing reached up and touched an uninsulated electric wire and
was injured, the defendant company was held liable. Elec. Light Co. v.
Healey, 65 Kan., 798. So where a child, hunting a ball on the top of a
building, came into contact with an urinsulated wire and was injured, the
Court held that the child was not guilty of contributory negligence, and
the company was held liable for the injury.- Day v. Consolidated Light
Co., 136 Mo. App., 274. But in a similar case in Massachusetts the Court
reached a contrary conclusion. Sullivan v. Boston R. Co., 156 Mass., 378.
5o Where a boy was on the roof of a house to look into an adjoining theater,
and was injured by the defendant's wire, in an action to recover damages
the Court held, that aside from the question as to the defendant's negli-
gpence in Tiaintaining its wires, the plaintiff's contributory negligence in
touching the wire was a bar to recovery, if he was old enough to know
better. Cionberland v. Lottig, 95 Md., 42. And where a boy playing in
the street threw a piece of telephone wire over an imperfectly insulated
electric wire of the defendant's, the Court held the company not liable for
the injury, and the art of the boy was held to be the proxitnate cause of
the injury. Stark v. Muskegpp Traction Co., 141 Mich., 575. The circum-
stances in the principal case are peculiar. The facts show that the de-
fective insulation was not in a place where people are likely to come into
contact with the wires, and the injury was brought about by the inde-
pendent act of the boy in a way which could not have been anticipated by
the company. In view pf these facts the rule laid down in the principal
case must be regarded as sound.
EMINENT DOMAIN-NATURE OF RIGHT-CHANGE OF USE.-LucAs ET AL.
v. ASHLAND LIGHT, MILL & POWER Co., 138 N. W. (NEB.), 761.-Right of
flowage of private lands for the purpose of erecting a dam to run a grist
mill was obtained in ad quod dainnum proceedings by the defendant's
pssignor. After ten years' use the mill was destroyed and an electric light
plant placed on the site. In a prooeeding to restrain defendant from
maintaining this dam for the manufacture of electricity it was held that it
was not nppessry to recondemn the land for the new use.
The law of ePinent domain will not authorize the taking of private
property except for public use. Loughridge v. Harris, 42 Ga., 500; Apd4er-
son v. Kerilp Draining Co., 14 Ind.. 99; Bennett v. Doyle, 14 Barb., 551.
In ad quo4 gamntlm proceedings one of the findings of the jpry must be
that the propose4 use i$ a public use. Mpa7lley v. Cfpningtqn, 9 1la.,583; City of Detroit v. .b1p. Brennan & 93 Mich., ,338; t. LqIs, fc.,
R. 7o. v. Petty, 57 A*- r.9. The right acquired in condennatiqp pro-
gpedings, whbere the fee to the land is not acquired, is limited to an ease-
mept for the particular purpose intended. Newuton v. Manufacturers' Ry.
Cp., 115 Fed., 781; Julien v. Woodsinall, 82 Ind., 568. An aban4onment
or non-user forfeits such an easement. Newton v. Manufacturers' Ry.
Co.; supra; Jessup v. Loucks, 55 Pa. St., 350. Change of use is an aban-
donment. Gross v. Jones, 85 Neb., 77. When a particular use for which
an easement in land has been acquired is abandoned, the land must be re-
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condemned' before it can be lawfully devoted to a new purpose. Pitts-
burg, etc., R. Co. v. Bruce, 102 Pa., 23; Campbell v. City of Kansas City,
102 Mo., 326. In such proceedings under statute the provisions must be
strictly complied with. Shackleford v. Coffey, 4 J. J. Marsh (Ky.), 40;
McCulley v. Cunningham, 96 Ala., 583. The principal case'arose under a-
statute providing that in ad quod damnum proceedings the petitioner must
set forth the kind of a mill proposed to be built and a jury must find that
such mill will be 'of public utility. Nebraska Statutes, Secs. 7300-01, 7307.
In changing the 'use of the water to the manufacture of electricity, neither
of these requirements were satisfied. As no additional'burden was put
upon the land by the new use the decision of the case works no substan-
tial injustice but it lay down a rule which, if generally followed, might do-
injustice and it would not be wise public policy to adopt it.
GAMING-BETTING AT CRAPS-PRIVATE IRESIDENCE.-KNOWLES V. STATE,
150 S. W., (TEX. CR.), 777.-Held, that betting at a game of craps is a
violation of the statute, whether done at a private residence or elsewhere,
Gaming, at common law, was not an indictable offense. Jenks v.. Tur-
pin, 13 Q. B. D., 505; United States v. Dixon, 4 Cranch C. C., 107. It is-
now a statutory offense in many of the States. Matter of Brown, 156
Cal., 632; State v. Lewis, 12 Wis., 434. In many jurisdictions there are-
statutes against betting at certain designated places. State v. Robb, 115 La.,
733; State v. Burns, 54 Wash., 113. Other statutes are more general but
provide that persons gaming in a private residence shall be exempt-from
prosecution. Thrasher v. State, 168 Ala., 130. In Texas under a former
statute playing at a private residence was excepted. White v. State, 39
Tex. Cr., 269; Stewart v. White, 34 Tex. Cr., 33. Under these statutes a
private residence is prima facie exempted but it may be shown that it is-
a resort for gambling within the meaning of the statute. Tolbert v. State,
87 Ala., 27. Under a statute of 1907 in Texas it was held in two cases
that gambling at a private residence was forbidden. Singleton v. State,
53 Tex. Cr., 625; Purvis v. State, 52 Tex. Cr., 342. But these two cases
were overruled in a later decision, the Court holding that the statute had'
never uncovered the sanctity of the family circle, and that the statute only-
makes it a violation of the law when the proprietor permits his residence
to be used as a common resort for gambling. Purvis v. State, 62 Tex. Cr.,.
302. This opinion was rendered in 1911. The decision in the principal
case is by the same judge and an opposite conclusion is reached. The only
difference between the two cases is that in the former case the betting was
at cards, and the latter the betting was at craps. The Revised Criminal
Statutes of Texas, Article 557, provides that no person shall be indicted
under this article for playing said games . . .at a private residence occu-
pied by a family, unless same is commonly resorted to for the purpose of
gambling. The clear intention of the statute, though the word "craps'"
is not used, is to exempt a person from punishment for gambling at a pri-
vate residence which is not a gambling resort.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT-RIGHT OF LANDLORD TO EXPEL TENANT HOLD-
ING OVER-DAMAGES.-SAROS V. AVENUE THEATER Co., 137 N. W. (MICH.),
559.Held, that where landlord injects formaldehyde into room of tenant
holding over, he is liable in damages for injuries caused thereby.
The rule in most jurisdictions in the United States is that, where a
tenant unlawfully holds over, the landlord has a right to peaceably enter
and expel the tenant, using no more force than is necessary. Stearns v.
Sampson, 59 Me., 568; Hyatt v. Wood, 4 Johns, 150; Gillespie v. Beecher,
85 Mich., 347. In Massachusetts it was held that, where a landlord forcibly
entered and forcibly expelled the tenant, he was not liable civilly for the
assault, unless he used more force than was necessary in the expulsion.
Low v. Elwell, 121 Mass., 309. In New Jersey the landlord may take
possession by any means short of personal violence, remove goods, and
then protect his possession by force. Todd v. Jackson, 26 N. J. L., 525.
But in Kansas a landlord is liable in damages to such a dispossessed ten-
ant for injury occasioned by forcible entry. Whitney v. Brown, 90 Pac.,
277. In Vermont, Illinois, Connecticut and other States, statutes of forc-
ible entry and detainer have much abridged the landlord's right according
to the prevalent American rule. In Larkin v. Avery, 23 Conn., 304, it was
held that the landlord must resort to legal remedy to get possession.
Where expulsion by force is allowed the rule is to require the landlord to
choose such a means as will effect the end without inflicting wanton or
unnecessary injury. This was the ground for the decision in Huggins v.
Bridges, 29 Pa. Super. Ct., 82, where it was held that a landlord was liable
in damages for injury caused by poisoning the atmosphere of the room
by stopping up the chimney flue and forcing smoke into the room. The
reason for the rule announced in the principal case is the same as that
which requires one in abating a nuisance to do no more damage than is
necessary and to choose means which are reasonably adapted to the end,
and is in accord with the plain dictates of reason and justice.
LIMITATION OF AcTioNS.-MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-PENDENCY OF Ap-
PEAL.-LEERING V. NATIONAL BANK OF MORROW COUNTY, 100 N. E.,
(OHIO), 323.-Held, that the right to sue for malicious prosecution of a
civil action accrues upon the rendition in the Trial Court of a judgment
for the defendant in the action complained of, and is barred by the statute
of limitations if not brought within one year after such judgment, although
a proceeding in error may have intervened.
This decision is at variance with the weight of authority which holds
that pending an appeal the statutes will not run against matters which
are still properly cognizable in the proceeding. Patrick v. National Bank
of Commerce, 63 Neb., 200. Nor can it be reconciled with the general
Tule that an action for malicious prosecution cannot be maintained pending
an appeal. Nebenzahl v. Townsend, 61 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 353; Reynolds
v. DeGeer, 13 II1. App., 113; Griffith v. Ward, 20 U. C. Q. B. (Canada),
31; since the essential element in an action for malicious prosecution is
the acquittal of the defendant in the suit complained of; Monroe v. Maples,
1 Root (Conn.), 553; and the action cannot be maintained until the suit
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complained of is terminated in favor of the defendant therein. Daily v.
Donath, 100 Ill. App., 52; Hays v. Blizzard, 30 Ind., 457. The holding
of the principal case would in many instances necessitate bringing the
action for malicious prosecution while an appeal is pending, and, though
the pending of an appeal might be a good reason for a stay of proceed-
ings, Dreyfus v. Aid, 29 Neb., 191; Rogers v. Mullins, 20 Tex. Civ. App.,
250; it seems useless to put the'defendant in the alleged malicious prose-
cution to the expense of instituting proceedings, when by a subsequent de-
cision of the Appellate Court he may lose the essential element of his
action.
MASTER AND SERVANT-MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURY TO SERVANT-
RISKS ASSU.MED.-H. D. WILLIAMNS COOPERAGE CO. V. SAMS, 198 FED., 852.-
Held, that a servant assumes only those extraordinary risks of his employ-
ment which he knows and appreciates or which are obvious, and not those
which by the exercise of ordinary care, he should have known but did not.
The doctrine is well settled that a workman assumes the risks that
are incidental to his employment. Rummel v. Dilworth, 131 Pa., 509. But
it is recognized common law that a servant who has no knowledge, actual
or constructive, of an extraordinary risk, is not chargeable with its as-
sumption. Labatt on Master and Servant, V6I. 1, Sec. 274. But the ser-
vant is charged with knowledge if the danger is obvious. Gleninont Lum-
ber Co. v. Roy, 126 Fed., 524. Contra, Stiller v. Bohn Mfg. Co., 80 Minn.,
1. And the master is not liable where knowledge of the danger is open
alike to the master and servant and is incidental to the employment,
Murphy v. Edgar Zinc Co., 83 Kan., 627; except where the defect is dis-
coverable only on strict investigation. Miner v. Franklin County Tel. Co.,
.83 Vt., 311. In many States the liability is determined by statute, but
there is a long line of cases that hold that a servant assumes not only such
risks as would ordinarily be incidental to his employment, but also such
as he could discover by the exercise of his opportunities for inspection.
Lehman v. VanNostrand, 165 Mass., 233; Perigo v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,
52 Iowa, 276. Or by the use of "ordinary care", Sievers v. Peters Co.,
151 Ind., 642; "reasonable care and skill", W. U. Tel. Co. v. McMullen,
58 N. J. L., 155; "ordinary observation or reasonable diligence", Latre-
mouville v. Bennington & R. R. Co., 63 Vt., 336. For a list of cases in
point see 26 Cyc., p. 1304, notes 17 and 20. In the view of the best authori-
ties, the decision in the title case is too harsh on the master. .The better
view is that the servant must use some degree of care in any case.
NEGLIGENCE- DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTS - AUTOMOBILES. - PARKER V.
WILSON, 60 So., (ALA.), 151.-Held, that automobiles are not to be classed
with such highly dangerous agencies as dynamite or savage animals and
are not to be regarded as dangerous per se.
The law takes notice that certain things are a source of extraordinary
risk, and a man who exposes his neighbor to such risk is held liable for
any consequent harm, not due to some cause beyond human foresight and
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control. Pollock on Torts, 307 (*394). They are such instruments as
are in their nature calculated to do injury to mankind. Loop v. Littlefield,
42 N. Y., 351, 359. But an automobile is not inherently or per se a dan-
gerous machine, so as to render its owner liable on that ground alone, for
injuries resulting from its use. Vincent v. Crandall & Godley Co., 131
N. Y. App., 200; Steffen v. McNaughton, 142 Wis., 49. An automobile
cannot be placed in the same category as locomotives, gunpowder, dyna-
mite, and similar dangerous agencies, Jones v. Hoge, 47 Wash., 663; nor
is it to be classed with bad dogs, vicious bulls, evil disposed mules, and
the like. Lewis v. Amorous, 59 S. E. (Ga.), 338. In fact an automobile is
an ordinary vehicle of pleasure and business, and is no more dangerous
than a team of horses and a carriage, or a gun, sail-boat, or motor launch.
Cunningham v. Castle, 127 N. Y. App., 580. But its great weight, speed,
power, and resulting momentum render the driving of an automobile at
a high rate of speed through city streets in itself actionable negligence,
and what may be a safe rate of speed at which to ride a bicycle or drive
a horse may be an unreasonably rapid rate at which to drive an automo-
bile in the same place. Irwin v. Judge, 81 Conn., 492, 501. On the other
hand, it was held in Ingraham v. Stockmore, 118 N. Y. Supp., 399, and in
Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 140 S. W. (Ky.), 1047, that an automobile
is a dangerous machine; these cases, however, seem to be unsupported by
any other decisions.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-EXTENT OF LIABILITY-TERm-RE-EMPLOY-
MENT.-FIDELITY MUT. LIFE INS. Co. v. RICHLAND ET AL., 138 N. Y. S.,
763.-Held, that the sureties on a bond conditioned for a due performance
of the requirements of the principal's contract of a certain date as insur-
ance solicitor, and of any amendments and supplements thereto, and of all
contracts thereafter made between the parties, were liable only for default
of the principal occurring during his continuous employment, and not for
defaults occurring after he had resigned and been re-employed. Ingraham,
P. J., and Dowling, J., dissenting.
A bond given by an officer of a lodge ceases to be in force if there is
an interruption in his holding the office, though the bond provide for its
continuance so long as he shall hold office by election, re-election or other-
wise. Coombs v. Harford, 99 Me., 426. And sureties for an agent are
not liable for an indebtedness arising after principal has terminated the
agency. Phillips v. Singer Mfg. Co., 88 Ill., 305. Where there has been
an interim when the principal was not employed as required by the bond
but is later re-employed, surety is not liable. Lexington, etc., R. Co. v.
Elwell, 8 Allen (Mass.), 371. But in Shackamaxon Bank v. Yard, 143
Pa. St., 129, it was held that the sureties were bound for the whole period
of principal's service even though the service is not continuous. In every
case, the question is, what is the meaning of the phrases: "continuance in
office", "duration of employment", etc., and the Court in the principal case
follows the great majority of Courts in holding that such expressions
mean, in the absence of anything inconsistent in the context, that the time-
shall be continuous, without any interim or cessation of rights and duties,
even though a contract of re-employment be made at once.
